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EQUALITY AT THE CEMETERY GATES: STUDY OF AN
AFRICAN AMERICAN BURIAL GROUND
By William A. Engelhart *

I. Introduction
In Charlottesville, Virginia, the University Cemetery serves as the
final resting place of many of the most prominent community members
of the University of Virginia. In 2011, the University planned an expansion. During archaeological research to this end, sixty-seven previously
unidentified interments, in both adult and child-sized grave shafts, were
discovered on the proposed site of expansion, to the northeast of the
University Cemetery. Further archival research revealed that “at least two
late nineteenth century references note that enslaved African Americans
were buried north of but outside the enclosed University, in an adjacent
wooded area.” 1 In one, Col. Charles Christian Wertenbaker recalls: “in
old times, the University servants were buried on the north side of the
cemetery, just outside of the wall.” 2 Current research suggests that at least
as late as 1898 the area of land was recognized as historically utilized by
the University of Virginia for “servant” burials. 3 Since these discoveries, a
cemmemoration ceremony has been held. 4 Some beautification measures
have been undertaken: a specially designed fence has been installed; some
trees have been planted; and at both entrances an informational sign is
posted explaining the significance of the plot. Still, this newly rediscovered sacred space stands in stark contrast to the marble tombs and gilded
cenotaphs of the University Cemetery and adjacent Confederate monument.

* The author would like to thank Professor Michael Doran for his invaluable support, insight and guidance.
1. RIVANNA ARCHAEOLOGICAL SERVICES, LLC, BEYOND THE WALLS: AN AFRICAN
AMERICAN BURIAL GROUND AT THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, 23 (2013).
2. Id.
3. Id. at iii.
4. Anne E. Bromley, U.VA. Group Honors Unknown Slaves at Burial Site, Sets Stage for
Future Work, UVATODAY (Oct. 16, 2014), https://news.virginia.edu/content/uvagroup-honors-unknown-slaves-burial-site-sets-stage-future-work.
1
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Typically, descendants of the dead reserve rights in a cemetery in
the form of some kind of property interest. 5 Mourners and the children
of mourners may return from time to time to pay their respects and tend
to the graves of their dearly departed. In general, this is a well-established
right (though further investigation will reveal that it somewhat less clear
than one might expect). 6 However, slavery in America has frustrated
many rights, and its long shadow continues to disrupt others. Because of
the nature of this property interest, today in Charlottesville, the cemetery
rights of the descendants of those slaves interred to the northeast of the
University Cemetery are arguably extinguished, or at best unclear. The
owner of the cemetery, the University of Virginia, has made no attempt
to exclude or to sell the land, nor likely would they, but it is unclear that
they could not should they so desire. There are likely other slave cemeteries, on public and private land, that find themselves in a similar situation:
specifically, slave cemeteries and African American burial grounds that,
because of systemic oppression and discrimination, are rendered unprotected and abandoned—descendants’ rights vanished into nothing.
In exploration of this problem, this paper lays out the historical legal
landscape of cemeteries, the special issues that arise in slave cemeteries
generally, and the application of these doctrines to the African American
burial ground in Charlottesville. Additionally, it presents a suggested legal
treatment of this special type of property interest: namely, that there
should be legislative reform that, in the case of abandoned slave cemeteries, creates both a public easement allowing access and broad statutory
standing so that communities can work together to maintain these sacred
sites and police against desecration. Further, the development of the
rights of sepulture in American common law and the accompanying legal
solicitude would allow judges to read this regime into existence, even in
absence of formal legislative measures.
II. Grave Law
Respect for hallowed ground can be a strong motivator. As one
scholar noted, the land underlying the former World Trade Center, some
of the most valuable real estate in the world, was set aside after the events
of September 11, 2001 as consecrated and no longer appropriate for
commercial development or even private ownership.7 In its place stands
the National September 11th Memorial and Museum, a testament to the

5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part II.
7. Mary L. Clark, Treading on Hallowed Ground: Implications for Property Law and Critical
Theory of Land Associated with Human Death and Burial, 94 KY. L.J. 487, 489-490 (2005).
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widespread agreement that memorial property stands apart. Many authors have remarked on the seemingly unusual treatment of memorial
spaces generally and burial grounds in particular. As one wrote, “. . . at
the outset it must be emphasized that a cemetery lot is treated for most
purposes as being unlike any other piece of real or personal property.” 9
The motivation for this unusual treatment is not surprising. Death and
mourning are part of the human experience and necessarily implicate the
management of the cadaver. Funeral custom can take many forms, and in
some societies (including our own), burial in the earth is not uncommon.
As expected, the weight of tradition and ritual is bound up with the body
in the land, and as one court explained: “our reverence . . . creates a
strong natural desire that it shall never be disturbed or desecrated, and
that the place where it rests shall be regarded as consecrated ground, and
its beauty preserved until the end of time.”10
This compelling dictum, if vague, alludes to a number of rights
contained in a cemetery lot. There appears to be some protection against
desecration; but also, unsurprisingly, a right to access the graveyard to
mourn and maintain, and often a right to bury other relatives on the
property. 11 Mary L. Clark describes an even broader series of legal protections that cut across the breadth of property law, special treatment she
calls “solicitude.” 12 Under her analysis, legal protection granted to parcels
of land associated with human death and burial include a protection
against adverse possession, an inability to be partitioned or mortgaged,
and an immunity from taxation. 13 The shifting bundle of rights related to
the burial of the dead can be referred to, somewhat archaically, as the
“right of sepulture.”14
What is unusual then is not that jurists should feel motivated to
grant special protections to burial grounds, but rather that these protections were constructed—somewhat inconsistently—out of the seemingly
inadequate building blocks of Anglo-American property law. Indeed,
throughout the Middle Ages and even into the mid-19th century, the
Christian Church maintained exclusive control over the regulation of in8. Id. at 490.
9. R.S., Note, The Cemetery Lot: Rights and Restrictions, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 378, 378
(1961).
10. Clark, supra note 7, at 507.
11. Alfred L. Brophy, Grave Matters: The Ancient Rights of the Graveyard, 2006 BYU L.
REV. 1469, 1479 (2006).
12. Clark, supra note 7, at 496-505.
13. Id.
14. PERCIVAL E. JACKSON, THE LAW OF CADAVERS AND OF BURIAL AND BURIAL
PLACES 27 (2d ed. 1950). Alternatively, “sepulcher.” However, some sources maintain
that the right of sepulture refers only to the right, before burial, to be buried and, after
burial, not to be dug up. Id.
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terment in England, and canon law was exclusively applied. Crucial to
this system was the fact that the Church of England was the one and only
church and that it largely owned all burial places. 16 Because of this, cemetery law at the time of the American Revolution was contained in ecclesiastical law. 17 When the United States rejected the establishment of a single state church, it created a sizable legal void regarding burial places. 18
Since Congress and state legislatures mostly ignored the issue, most “disputes in the 18th and 19th centuries were litigated . . . and early American jurists were charged with resolving them under common law rules.”19
In the 21st century, state statutory law gives some guidance, but much of
the shape of the law of burial places still derives from U.S. common law
developed after the American Revolution.
One primary issue is the difficulty in determining exactly what kind
of property interest these rights stem from. Courts have most frequently
construed it as either some kind of easement or license; but as one scholar
noted, courts have even read a cemetery lot deed as a security to prevent
speculation. 20 Occasionally, jurisdictions have described the right as a
qualified fee, 21 but often even deeds purporting to convey a fee have been
held to convey an easement only. 22 All things considered, it might be
more useful to look at the treatment of the right of sepulture generally.
As described in a law review article from the 1960s:
Inasmuch as courts rarely reach divergent results merely on the
basis of the label attached to the interest, it is more realistic to
acknowledge the unique way in which cemetery lots are treated; otherwise the true issues are confused and concealed by
arbitrarily assigning real property tags which have the characteristics desired for the resolution of a particular case conso-

15. Jackson, supra note 14, at 21-22. That is, until the English Burial Acts in 1855. Id.
16. Tanya D. Marsh, When Dirt and Death Collide: Legal and Property Interests in Burial
Places, 30(2) PROB. & PROP. MAG. March/April 2016.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 2.
19. Id.
20. R.S., supra note 9, at 379. “Cemetery lots have a pronounced tendency to rise in
price over a period of time as a result of two factors: additional improvements which enhance the appearance of the cemetery, and the constant depletion of available burial
space . . . In an attempt to exploit this commercial truth, unscrupulous promoters have
promised huge profits on resale to encourage purchases of large quantities of lots of investment purposes.” Id. at 395.
21. Id. at 380.
22. Jackson, supra note 14, at 358.
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nant with an appropriate though enunciated theory of cemetery law. 23
A leading treatise on the topic, contemporary to the law review article,
muses on proposed property designations before capitulating: “in any
event, an interest in real property.”24 That being said, the property interest is most commonly described as an easement in gross held by the relatives of the buried person, and it descends by operation of law but is neither devisable nor alienable. 25 This construction will be used to analyze
the right of sepulture generally, and later when dealing with the wrinkles
that arise in slave cemeteries.
The existence of this easement is evaluated based on three main
components: some kind of dedication, a determination that the cemetery
has not been abandoned, and some type of connection between those
buried and those seeking access. 26 The standard for dedication appears to
be rather low. As one commentator puts it, “the presence of a headstone
seems to be sufficient to establish dedication, but less may be sufficient.”27
In its most straightforward form, dedication can result from a determination that the landowner initially consented to the burial. However, some
small acknowledgement by the owner that people were being openly
buried in the cemetery is certainly enough. 28 Interestingly, this process of
dedication appears to express legal solicitude–the special treatment described by Clark–since dedication in the form of the conveyance of an
express easement does not seem to have to satisfy the statute of frauds as
would be typically required. 29 Indeed, “the common law of implied dedication emphasized that no particular act or ceremony was required to accomplish a dedication,” but many states (including Arizona, California,
Hawaii, Indiana, Montana, Oregon, Texas, and Washington) now for-

23. R.S., supra note 9, at 380.
24. Jackson, supra note 14, at 359.
25. Brophy, supra note 12, at 1479. Some cases refer to “heirs” instead of “relatives”
which would apply strictly to those who succeed in intestate succession. “Presumably the
term is intended to include named individuals (devisees and legatees) intestate succession
as well; succeeding generations of descendants become problematic.” RICHARD B.
CUNNINGHAM, ARCHAEOLOGY, RELICS, AND THE LAW 582 n.51 (2d ed. 2005). There is
a marked departure here from ecclesiastical law in England, since the easement was based
on a doctrine of “temporary appropriation of soil.” The right generated by the burial
would terminate with the dissolution of the body. Jackson, supra note 15, at 354. This is
not the regime in the United States, where permanent appropriation is the rule. Id. at
356.
26. Brophy, supra note 11, at 1490-92.
27. Id. at 1491.
28. See id.
29. See Jackson, supra note 14, at 221.
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malize dedication by statute, requiring a map of the cemetery boundaries
and some kind of written instrument. 30
Additionally, courts are very willing to accept that the easement can
be established without the landowner’s consent, by prescription.31 Further
solicitude is demonstrated in the prescriptive easement process since the
law of property typically requires continued use for a period specified by
state statute, but it seems that this kind of easement can be established as
soon as the body is buried. As one old treatise puts it, “in truth, whether
or not the body has been interred for a prescriptive period should be of
little moment, except that the reasons are graver that abhor the disturbance of the dead while the wounds of separation are fresh in the hearts of
the living.” 32 In other words, even as a practical concern, the ten or
twenty year period required by statute is the period during which a family would fight most passionately to protect the grave and during which
judges seem typically reluctant to disturb the dead. 33 While still a member
of the New York Court of Appeals, Justice Cardozo explained that “[t]he
dead are to rest where they have been laid unless reason of substance is
brought forward for disturbing their repose.” 34
The second basis for the property interest is the determination that
the cemetery has not been abandoned. In general, courts require “continuing use of the cemetery or at least some continuing recognition that
bodies are buried there.” 35 This is true even in cases where the cemetery
is no longer maintained because the location was lost for good reason, an
issue that will be explored infra as it relates to slave cemeteries. As one
court noted, even in a case where abandonment occurs because a persecuted sect chose not to advertise their gravesites through the erection of
markers for fear of desecration, the easement is lost. 36 In another instance,
a court failed to stop a zoning variance which would allow construction
over a cemetery in which there had been no new burials in a hundred
years. 37 However, in a minority of cases there may be some rights retained even in an abandoned cemetery.38

30. Cunningham, supra note 25, at 580-81 (2d ed. 2005).
31. Brophy, supra note 11, at 1489-90.
32. Jackson, supra note 14, at 230.
33. See id.
34. Marsh, supra note 16, at 5 (quoting Yome v. Gorman, 152 N.E. 126, 129 (N.Y.
1926)).
35. Brophy, supra note 11, at 1491.
36. Cunningham, supra note 25, at 590-91.
37. Brophy, supra note 11, at 1491.
38. See FLA. STAT. § 704.08 (2000) (noting a Florida statute allows family access to an
abandoned cemetery).
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Finally, there is a requirement of connection between the dead and
those attempting to assert their rights. As emphasized by Alfred L. Brophy:
. . . [T]here likely must be a connection between those buried
and those seeking access. No case articulates a requirement
that those seeking access actually knew the people they are
visiting. But it is possible that the people who are no longer
able to trace a specific connection may have no greater right
of access than members of the public.39
When an easement fails because no connection is established, the individual attempting to assert their rights may have rights no greater than the
public generally—which in many instances is no right at all. 40 As discussed below, this requirement too creates special problems in the context of historical African American cemeteries.
There is disagreement about the nature of the rights contained in
burial grounds. 41 The predominant view is, as mentioned, to treat a grave
and the corresponding right as an affirmative easement in gross across surrounding land to access the gravesite owned by the relatives of the deceased, and often a right to additional burials by family members.42 To
this, Brophy adds a restriction on the desecration of the graves and on the
right of the owner of the graveyard to “sell or mortgage the property or
use it in ways inconsistent with cemetery purposes.”43
The right of access is the most essential part of cemetery rights held
by relatives of the interred. As Brophy puts it, “At base, [it] is an easement in gross to cross private property to access a cemetery.” 44 Some state
law provides for this right explicitly, but in other jurisdictions it is presumed by common law. 45 Generally, this right is understood to be held
by the relatives of the deceased, but some states have expanded the right
statutorily. In West Virginia, for instance, a statute extends a right of access to friends of the deceased; and in Virginia a statute provides access
even to genealogical researchers. 46 Some states require that a permit be
obtained for access, but there is general agreement that there must be
some amount of reasonable access. 47 Exactly what counts as reasonable–in
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Brophy, supra note 11, at 1492.
Cunningham, supra note 25, at 596.
Id. at 582.
Id. See also Brophy, supra note 11, at 1479.
Brophy, supra note 11, at 1479.
Id.
Id. at 1479.
Id.
Id. at 1489.
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terms of frequency, time of day, and length of visits–has stirred up some
debate, with one court holding that a single four-hour visit per month is
sufficient. 48
Next is the right to bury more relatives in the cemetery, presuming
there is sufficient space. 49 Though one article is quick to admit that, as a
general matter, “permission to bury one person does not automatically
give that person’s spouse a right of burial as well,” 50 some states have
gone so far as to give the spouse a vested right if there is at least one burial space remaining. 51 However, even in the absence of a statute some
courts nevertheless presume its existence. In the 1911 case, Hines v. State,
the Tennessee Supreme Court stated: “The right of burial extends to all
the descendants of the owner who devoted the property to burial purposes, and they may exercise it when the necessity arises.” 52 Further, in
1980, the Florida District Court of Appeals found the easement “for future burial in unused grave sites to the extent that they are available.” 53 In
the absence of a statute designating the classes of persons entitled to burial, courts have usually attempted to allocate remaining spaces determined
by order of death. 54 Brophy points out that the lack of commentary by
courts renders the scope of this right unclear. 55
There is also a right against desecration–necessitated by the right of
access–if the owner of the plot (or a third party) destroys the grave because there will be nothing left to visit. 56 Most straightforwardly, desecration is damage to the grave. 57 As one court noted in 1933, “whoso disturbs a dead body merely to suit his own convenience does so at his own
risk.” 58 Desecration often arises in circumstances where, against relatives’
wishes, a monument is defaced or decorative plants are removed. 59 In the

48. Id.
49. Brophy, supra note 11, at 1489. See also Cunningham, supra note 26 (“. . . and perhaps even additional burial rights for successive members of the family.”).
50. R.S., supra note 9, at 396.
51. Id. at 398.
52. Brophy, supra note 11, at 1498 n.118.
53. Cunningham, supra note 25, at 580.
54. R.S., supra note 9, at 397 (“In the absence of such a statute, courts have attempted
to allocate the remaining spaces, usually by applying the general rule that as between
equal owners priority is determined by order of death.”).
55. Brophy, supra note 11, at 1498 n.118.
56. Id. at 1494.
57. Jackson, supra note 15, at 169.
58. Id. at 173.
59. R.S., supra note 9, at 394. Further examples can include the drilling of oil wells in
an existing cemetery, plowing over graves, or the burial of a dog in an adjoining lot. See
also Jackson, supra note 14, at 170. It is worth noting that there are two dogs buried in the
University Cemetery, former University of Virginia mascots.
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case of intentional desecration, the full range of legal and equitable relief,
from damages to injunction, are typically available to relatives and descendants. 60
Finally, burial grounds are accompanied by restraints on alienation
and restrictions on inconsistent use, which could be construed as rights
or, in some instances, burdens. 61 These restrictions are broad and affect
both the owner of the servient estate and the owners of the easement.
For example, courts have held it is likely not possible to sell or encumber
a public cemetery. 62 Other statutes make the cemetery lots indivisible.63
Further, once land is dedicated as a cemetery and a body has been buried,
the owner of the servient estate cannot take back the dedication nor can
anyone use the land inconsistently with this dedication.64
It is probably unfair to present this conflict in terms of a clash between the rights of the living and the rights of the dead. More clearly,
“cemeteries pose a conflict between the rights of the living to have a
memorial for the dead and the rights of other living people to use the
land in (what to them is) a more productive fashion.” 65 The doctrine of
abandonment pushes back against dead hand control: “. . . when the
names of the dead are no longer heard in the ears of men, and not even a
trace of their memory remains . . . to perpetually preserve the soil as sacred and hallowed ground, under such circumstances, does honor to neither the living nor the dead.”66
III. Slave Cemeteries
As a general matter and as a matter of outcomes, African American
burial grounds have not received the same legal solicitude as White burial
grounds. 67 As Clark describes it:
[I]n contrast with law’s solicitous treatment of cemeteries generally . . . the history of legal treatment of slave and other
long-standing African-American burial grounds has been one

60. Brophy, supra note 11, at 1496.
61. Id. at 1498-99.
62. Id. at 1498.
63. R.S., supra note 9, at 399.
64. Clark, supra note 7, at 499. The true breadth of the lacuna in American cemetery
law post-revolution is demonstrated by the origin of this doctrine. Courts looked back to
Roman law where even one burial set the land apart as divine, dedicated to sacred purposes.
65. Brophy, supra note 11, at 1501.
66. Clark, supra note 7, at 497.
67. Id. at 514.
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of neglect or outright disregard. These burial sites have not
typically benefited from solicitous application of adverse possession, dedication, eminent domain, trespass, criminal desecration and other legal principles. Rather, they have been
permitted to be alternatively overlooked or destroyed.68
Indeed, the recent successful treatment of the African Burial Ground National Monument in Lower Manhattan in the 1990s represents a departure from the status quo achieved only through “substantial lobbying and
organizing efforts.” 69 In this example, 15,000 graves were discovered in
downtown Manhattan during the construction of a federal building.70
The US General Service Administration strategy was to “plough forward
with construction while holding required public meetings and expediting
the archaeology excavation,” and cessation of this project through the securing of National Historic Landmark was possible only through mass
protests of development. 71
This is of course only one small part of the story since cemeteries,
like other real property, are affected by historical policies of racial segregation that applied in both life and death. In 1950, an author presented as
factual matters that “in parts of the country where racial feeling is as
strong as religious feeling, one finds a ready tendency to prevent the introduction of bodies of members of the colored race in cemeteries used
by the whites,” and that racially discriminatory covenants were permitted. 72 Until recently, cemeteries routinely denied burial plot purchase opportunities to African Americans through different types of racially restrictive covenants. As late as the 1930s, around 90% of cemeteries
contained some sort of racially restrictive covenant. 73 Moreover, integration attempts were protested by threats of some form of postmortem
White flight: “so great is the opposition . . . to the interment of colored
persons . . . large numbers of the dead already interred therein would be
removed . . . .”74 In other cases cemetery officials threatened: “if the colored people did buy lots it would only make the neighbors angry and
kick and remove to some other part of the cemetery or possibly to some

68. Id.
69. Id. at 514 n.98.
70. Michael L. Blakey, African Burial Ground Project: Paradigm for Cooperation,
UNESCO 61 (2010).
71. Clark, supra note 7, at 514. See also id.
72. Jackson, supra note 14, at 380.
73. Kitty Rogers, Integrating the City of the Dead: The Integration of Cemeteries and the
Evolution of Property Law, 1900-1969, 56 ALA. L. REV. 1153, 1156 (2005).
74. Id. at 1157.
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other cemetery.” Ultimately, courts applied the landmark civil rights
decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. to cemeteries, barring “all racial
discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of property . . .” 76—though misconceptions about this fact have been recorded as
late as the 2000 edition of American Jurisprudence, which stated that
“regulations of cemetery association restricting the right of burial members of a particular ethnic group or race will be upheld.”77
In an earlier case, in 1955, though concurring with an opinion upholding a racially discriminatory policy, Justice Dooling of the Supreme
Court of California stated: “The good people who insist on the racial
segregation of what is mortal in man may be shocked to learn when their
own lives end that God has reserved no racially exclusive position for
them in the hereafter.”78 Despite this move for equality, in many cases
the damage may already be done. Lawsuits by African American purported rightsholders have often failed. 79 These cases demonstrate legal obstacles particular to this situation. Most importantly, they reveal how the institution of slavery and further systemic oppression have confounded the
regime of abandonment and the requirement of connection or standing.
IV. Abandonment Applied
As mentioned above, courts typically require that a cemetery not be
abandoned if burial ground rights holders are to have rights at all. 80 This
turns on evidence that the cemetery has continued to be used, or at the
least that there is some continued recognition of its status as a cemetery. 81
One court stated that “as long as a cemetery is kept and preserved as a
resting place for the dead, with anything to indicate the existence of
graves or as long as it is known and recognized by the public as a graveyard, it is not abandoned.” (alteration in original). 82 Even in lieu of formal
recognition, tombstones or markers should be enough.83

75. Id.
76. Id. at 1163.
77. Id. at 1166.
78. Id. at 1161.
79. Clark, supra note 7, at 516; Mai-Linh K. Hong, “Get Your Asphalt Off My Ancestors!”: Reclaiming Richmond’s African Burial Ground, 13(1) LAW, CULTURE AND THE
HUMANITIES 81, 83 (2013).
80. Brophy, supra note 11, at 1491 nn.89-90.
81. Id.
82. C. Allen Shaffer, The Standing of the Dead: Solving the Problem of Abandoned Graveyards, 32 CAP. L. REV 479, 489 (2004) (quoting Heiligman v. Chambers, 338 P.2d 144,
148 (Okla. 1959)).
83. Id.
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If the cemetery is determined to be abandoned, the easement is at
worst entirely extinguished and at best, severely restricted. 84 After disinterment and reinternment of the bodies elsewhere, the land where the
easement attached, i.e. the servient estate, can be returned to trade and
commercial use. 85 It appears not to matter that the location of the cemetery was lost for good reason. In one case, a cemetery was considered
abandoned because no markers were found, even though the graves
weren’t marked because the interred—the persecuted religious sect of
Quakers—purposely failed to erect tombstones out of fear of desecration. 86
This line of argumentation has been successfully applied to slave
cemeteries. In Dove v. May, the Virginia Supreme Court allowed the
Virginia State Highway Commission to build a road over a slave burial
site that was found to be abandoned (after moving the graves to another
site). 87 In application to the University of Virginia’s own African American burial ground, the lack of grave markers speaks to an oppressive reality of slavery and Jim Crow era policies.
At the University of Virginia cemetery, it is likely that slaves may
have chosen not to mark their graves out of a fear of grave robbing. The
School of Medicine and Anatomy required cadavers for dissection and to
this end, the bodies of slaves, free Blacks, and poor Whites were targeted. 88 In addition, grave robbing was not illegal until 1848, well after the
establishment of the University Cemetery in 1828. 89 At least one medical
student was verified as having been involved with grave robbing in
1834. 90 In this case, the student was shot while attempting to steal the
body of a dead African American. 91 The student survived and the man
who shot him was “sent to the [p]enitentiary.”92 It was not until 1851
that the University of Virginia began to send for cadavers from Richmond, and even later, in 1884, that the Generally Assembly of Virginia
made it easier to acquire cadavers legally. 93 It is not surprising then that
the enslaved and free African American communities at the University of
Virginia would employ strategies to avoid the depraved attention of the
grave robbers. According to one account, “it was then said that many of

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Cunningham, supra note 25, at 597.
Id.
Id. at 590.
Clark, supra note 7, at 516.
RIVANNA ARCHAEOLOGICAL SERVICES, LLC, supra note 1, at 25.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id. at 28.
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the bodies were only logs of wood or stones, for the fear of having their
dead taken up by the medical class . . . caused the negroes to inter their
dead secretly, and hold the usual ceremonies over the dummy.”94 It seems
shocking that the court would find abandonment where the indecent institution of grave robbing pressed community members to choose between memorializing the grave of their loved one and losing the rights
bound up in burial.
In addition, the current legal regime tends to favor Eurocentric burial practices and devalue potential historical African American preferences
for different forms of memorialization.95 African American burial practices
often differed from those of the White community; however, at the
Charlottesville cemetery, the east-west orientation of nearly all of the
graves suggests the introduction of a Christian idiom, though it is unclear
if this was the choice of the slave or the slave owner. As one scholar
notes, “[s]urface decoration of graves with ceramic and glass containers as
well as other material culture and plantings, often perceived by Whites as
abandoned trash, in reality conveyed significant meanings to both the living and the dead and contributed to the creation of a unique landscape.
Unfortunately, this unique landscape does not clearly protect a cemetery
against abandonment in the same way more traditionally European headstones might.”
Finally, even when memorials were constructed, there may have
been preferences for non-permanent markers which, compounded with
the potential destruction of monuments by early 20th century Whites,
leaves little to be found today. 96 During archaeological excavation, eight
of the sixty-seven grave shafts were found to contain a stone marker.97
Six of these were apparently unworked local stone, and no markings or
inscriptions could be found. 98 The remaining two, interpreted as headstones, were white quartzite tabular stone that had been broken at their
base. 99 No inscriptions or markings could be found on these either.100 Evidence shows that the 1915 cemetery expansion was, in part, “an intentional covering, or erasure, of a pre-existing African American burial
ground,” but it is unclear if at the time local African Americans attempted to speak out or to resist this encroachment.101 One author remarks that
“the ability to [erase the cemetery] and the racial overtones of such a de-
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Id. (emphasis in original omitted).
Id. at 57-58.
Id. at 43.
Id.
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RIVANNA ARCHAEOLOGICAL SERVICES, LLC, supra note 1, at 66.
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cision are grounded in the context of institutionalized racism . . . .”
This seems especially unjust considering that the Department of Veterans
Affairs has spent millions of dollars to produce and ship headstones to
mark the graves of Confederate dead. 103 While it seems proper to establish
national cemeteries and honor veterans of any conflict, since the government also provides headstones for veterans buried in private cemeteries,
this—as a practical matter—creates a system in which slave cemeteries fall
into abandonment first because their markers were maliciously destroyed
and then because society has chosen not to preserve them. 104
These realities result in a legal regime where, because of the institutions of slavery and Jim Crow and a general devaluation of African
American burial practices, cemeteries like the one at the University of
Virginia could be determined to be abandoned. Once this determination
is made, any easement is likely extinguished and disinterment becomes a
possibility. Thankfully, due to the recent rededication of the cemetery
(and reinstallation of a fence, signs, and other markers), it is extremely
unlikely that a court would find that the cemetery is abandoned.105
However, there remains the possibility that the original easement
was extinguished and that the new dedication creates a new easement in
gross in the public. This is relevant because it changes who holds the
right. Where the original easement was likely held by the descendants of
the interred—which is to say the descendants of the University’s slaves—
the new easement would be held by the public generally. This outcome
is arguably still problematic since the exclusivity of the right will have
been lost. Whereas the University previously could have excluded anyone except for the descendants due to the right of access, now the University would not be able to exclude anyone. Equally, the other rights in
the easement would be implicated. Suddenly, there may be a public right
for anyone to be buried in the cemetery, and a more general right against
desecration.
V. Issues of Standing
As mentioned above, one element of the easement is a connection
between the person buried and those seeking to enforce access or another
right. The institution of slavery has made it difficult or even impossible
for the descendants of slaves to show the kind of connection required for
102. Id. at 67.
103. Steven I. Weiss, You Won’t Believe What the Government Spends on Confederate
Graves, THE ATLANTIC (Jul. 19, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2013/07/government-spending-confederate-graves/277931/.
104. Id.
105. Bromley, supra note 4.
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the right of access or the kind of standing required to sue for desecration. 106 Slavery promoted the separation of families by sale and engendered laws that forbid recognition of slaves’ patrilineal descent. Postemancipation, mass migrations north muddled the record even more.107
In an instance where an alleged relative was trying to sue for desecration, one scholar noted, “the legal requirement of standing was confounded by slavery itself, which obscured the lineages of many African
American families, making impossible the evidence of biological descent
the court demanded.” 108 In general, lawsuits have demonstrated that only
individuals who can prove biological descent from those interred in slave
cemeteries have the ability to sue for injunctive or other relief if those
graves are desecrated. 109 In this situation, “if [the plaintiff’s] interest was
unidentifiable—and in effect, unrecognizable before the law—that is
‘precisely’ because his enslaved ancestors were stripped of identity by the
same state that now insisted a descendant be able to identify them.”110
The solution here is not clear. Better science could allow proof in
the form of some kind of DNA analysis or genetic testing, but a difficulty
arises when trying to “identify the plurality of African groups that comprise the diaspora. Because these individuals were not culturally homogeneous but came from a wide range of environments, the genetic variation
must have been diverse as well.” 111 So, rather than try and get better evidence, the standard could be modified.
For starters, the federal or state governments could create statutory
standing. In 1990 the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) solved a parallel problem in the Native American
context. 112 NAGPRA provides for the return from federal custody of Native American mortal remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural patrimony to the lineal descendants and culturally affiliated tribes. 113 As one scholar observed, “[t]he stipulations of NAGPRA
simply accommodate cultural reality in allowing Indian tribes to claim the
same next-of-kin status that Catholics might claim if a Spanish mission
cemetery were disturbed or that African Americans might claim if a slave
106. Hong, supra note 79, at 93.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 83.
109. Id. at 93.
110. Id. at 96.
111. Mark P. Leone, The Archaeology of Black Americans in Recent Times, 34 ANN.. REV.
ANTHROPOOGY. 575, 582 (2005).
112. Steve Russell, Sacred Ground: Unmarked Graves Protection in Texas Law, 4 TEX. F.
ON C. L. & C. R. 3, 4 (1998).
113. Mary L. Clark, Keep Your Hands Off My (Dead) Body: A Critique of the Ways in
Which the State Disrupts the Personhood Interests of the Deceased and His or Her Kin in Disposing of the Dead and Assigning Identity in Death, 58:1 RUTGERS L. REV. 45, 74 (2005).
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cemetery were disturbed. . . .” To some, “NAGPRA is seen by Native
American activities as the culmination of a civil rights movement on behalf of the dead.”115 Of course, there is no legal reality for the equivalent
African American claim.
Further, even this scheme is not without its own problems and
limitations. Under NAGPRA, an Indian tribe must show a cultural or
geographical relationship to the material to lay claim. 116 NAGPRA makes
the federal government into the gatekeeper of tribal identity since they
can choose which groups they are willing to recognize as a tribe. 117
Moreover, in instances of dispute, the federal government always maintains authority—such as in the case of the Kennewick Man when the remains of a man at least 8,000 years old were discovered and the government could not attribute the remains to any particular tribe.118
It can be an empirical problem as well as a formal one. NAGPRA
has been construed to apply only to a presently existing people. 119 Because of this, it is unclear how any individual remains found without artifacts could be Native American and therefore subject to NAGPRA. As
one observer puts it “bones without associated artifacts cannot be connected to a particular tribe except by geography and oral traditions.”120
Some of these similar issues might arise with the slave cemetery in
Charlottesville. As an initial matter, it is not certain that the cemetery
under analysis actually is a slave cemetery at all. One possibility is that it is
an older White cemetery that merely predates the University Cemetery, 121 but in the end, the evidence suggests it is in fact a slave cemetery.
For one, almost all of the burials in the University Cemetery have been
positively identified, and there are no other known sites of likely African
American burial. 122 Further, in some 19th century sources the site’s use as a
slave cemetery was mentioned. 123 One researcher compiled a list of enslaved African Americans who died at the University of Virginia between

114. Steve Russell, Law and Bones: Religion, Science, and the Discourse of Empire, 99
RADICAL HIST. REV. 214, 218 (2007).
115. Russell, supra note 112, at 4.
116. Id. at 8. To set up the issue, even in the case of the African American Burial
Ground National Monument, “[t]he African-Americans who had persistently lobbied to
protect the site needed a group-rights category such as the ‘culturally affiliated group’
moniker used in NAGPRA legislation.” One term, “descendant community,” seems useful, but its boundaries are hard to define. Id.
117. Clark, supra note 113, at 77-78.
118. Id. at 75-76.
119. Russell, supra note 112, at 221.
120. Id. at 221.
121. RIVANNA ARCHAEOLOGICAL SERVICES, LLC, supra note 2, at 61.
122. Id. at 62.
123. Id. at 61-62.

FALL 2019]

Equality at the Cemetary Gates

17

1853-61, and this list could be used to inform as to who the occupants of
the graves are and who might be their descendants. 124 But as University
Landscape Architect Mary Hughes, who worked on the project, stated:
“I’m sure they will look as hard as they can to find definitive information, but it may be that we will never have a definitive answer.” 125
Currently, any descendants of the enslaved African Americans in the
Charlottesville cemetery would have a difficult time proving: (1) it is a
slave cemetery, (2) the identity of the buried person, and (3) a relation to
the buried person. Statutory standing could relieve some of this pressure,
either by deferring to a descendant community or by creating standing
for the public more generally.
VI. Slave Cemeteries as Public Sites
Ideally, slave cemeteries should be construed as easements in gross
held by the pubic and composed of a right to access, a right against desecration, and a right against alienation or inconsistent use. The right to
further burial, which is often spoken of as a component of burial rights, is
first, not spoken of universally, and second, probably too problematic to
apply under this construction. If the easement in gross held by the public
allowed anyone to be buried there—assuming sufficient space—this
would surely frustrate the reasons slave cemeteries should receive special
treatment in the first place (e.g. a reparations theory or as a memorial to
historical segregation and oppressive practices). This construction helps
eliminate wrinkles created by the abandonment and standing issues.
As far as the abandonment issue is concerned, this construction
helps eliminate the need to prove that the easement was not abandoned.
While it is true the exclusive right may (or may not) have vanished, that
right is not greater than what would be vested in the public generally.
This is to say that everyone would have a right to access the cemetery. In
a world where the easement is only held by the relatives, the owner of
the servient estate cannot exclude the relatives from the land. But in a
world where the easement is held by everyone, the owner of the servient
estate cannot exclude anyone. If a slave grave were discovered in a private cemetery, the effect of this policy is that the landowner would not
be able to exclude anyone from visiting the cemetery. 126 The exclusive

124. Id. at 64.
125. The Daily Progress, Charlottesville, Va., UVA Forgotten Cemetery: Archaeological
Survey Uncovers 67 Graves, Likely Black Slaves, HUFFPOST: BLACK VOICES (Dec. 04, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/04/uva-forgotten-cemetery-67-graves-likelyslaves_n_2237112.html.
126. Though as mentioned before this would not have to be an unlimited right. They
choose to have visiting hours or otherwise limit the right.
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right does have its appeal: “it also offers the descendants of slaves a piece
of property—an easement for access—however small, that their ancestors
left for them.” 127 However, the benefit of construing the right as a public
easement is that helps ensure that the cemetery, as a memorial, keeps the
history of slavery visible – rather than built over or hidden away on private estates. 128 Under a reparations theory, there are two benefits: (1) taking the property interest off the market shows respect, and (2) the descendants of slaves are offered a piece of property. 129 As one commentator
noted, “[i]n the end, preservation of land associated with death and burial
of non-Whites can be a powerful form (among others) of repatriation for
histories of racial oppression.” 130 Property is valuable, even an easement,
and its donation to the public would not be meaningless. She argues that
“[t]he decision to use property to preserve off-market land associated
with the death and burial of historically subordinated peoples can be an
important step in redress and rebuilding of trust. . . .” 131 To the second
point, while this interest would not be going directly and exclusively to
the descendants of the slave, it would be going to everyone, and so the
descendants would all be accounted for among those benefitting. It is important to notice that because of the institution of slavery, most or even
all servient estates would have been the land of the original slave owner.
Finally, the standing problem that arises in desecration cases can be
partially resolved through thinking of the easement as public. One court
described an easement, when abandoned, along the lines of this outcome:
“The rights of the descendants, in this situation, become merged with the
right of the public generally to insist that due respect be paid to the sanctity of human remains and human burial grounds if they should be uncovered inadvertently.” 132 As a policy matter, if everyone had standing to
sue for desecration—either statutorily or through other means—
cemeteries would receive the protection they deserve. If anyone saw the
owner of the land destroying monuments by driving a tractor across the
graves, they would be able to sue for desecration. Because the full scope
of legal and equitable relief is available, people would be motivated to go
to court to enforce these rights. The cemetery would be protected if
construction were enjoined, but people would be vigilant in search of
damages (maybe even punitive damages) that would go to the litigant.133

127. Brophy, supra note 11, at 1515.
128. Hong, supra note 79, at 102.
129. Brophy, supra note 11, at 1515.
130. Clark, supra note 7, at 530.
131. Id.
132. Cunningham, supra note 25, at 596.
133. They could be divided some other way: part going to the litigant and part going to
a maintenance fund.

FALL 2019]

Equality at the Cemetary Gates

19

Just as with qui tam, the hope of compensation motivates people to do
the right thing.
As a practical matter, legislators should come together at a state and
federal level in order to pass statutes codifying a public easement in abandoned slave cemeteries and to create broad statutory standing. There is at
least one state statue in Oklahoma that does, in fact, appear to use eminent domain to create an easement with a right to access abandoned
cemeteries on private property. 134 It states: “any relative of the deceased
who wishes to visit an abandoned cemetery which is completely surrounded by privately owned land . . . shall have the right to reasonable
ingress or egress for the purpose of visiting such cemetery.” 135 However,
as Brophy notes, the statute also specifically claims that “this section shall
not be interpreted to allow the creation of an easement or claim of easement . . . .” 136
However, even in absence of formal legislative action, courts could
potentially apply the flexible and powerful doctrine of solicitude and develop this regime on their own. Indeed, as mentioned above, cemetery
law was created seemingly ex nihilo by American jurists in the wake of the
Revolution. Despite some regulatory development in the 20th century,
courts have often applied solicitude to modify property doctrine when
dealing with sites associated with death and burial. It is not impossible
that judges could continue to find, through solicitude, new exceptions
buried in this sacred legal space.
In either case, the use of eminent domain in this context raises several problems. If the slave cemetery has been found to be abandoned and
the easement extinguished, the creation of a new public right will probably require compensation of the landowner. As a primary matter, the land
needs to be taken for legitimate public use. In 1954, “the Supreme Court
in Berman v. Parker recognized ‘fostering spirituality’ as a valid public use
for purposes of exercising public domain authority,” and this rationale
was used to create Gettysburg and Antietam. 137 Accordingly, it seems it
would be a legitimate public interest to foster spirituality through preserving these abandoned slave cemeteries, not to mention the importance
of preserving history or a under reparations theory. Payment of the landowners could be unpopular as a matter of public policy. Certainly, the
fair market value of a cemetery could not be terribly high, as inconsistent
use is already constrained, but in the case of an abandoned cemetery the
landowner may be free to disinter the bodies, reinter them elsewhere,
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and then return it to the typical course of trade and commerce. Should
the landowner dare to disturb the dead, the fair market value in this case
could be considerably higher.
VII. Conclusion
In Charlottesville, it may never come to all this. The University of
Virginia is an agent of the government and may be protected by sovereign immunity. Moreover, the University has taken great care in its analysis and moved forward with sensitivity, and indeed, rededicated the
cemetery to the public. Because of this, they likely would no longer be
able to exclude the public—not that they would want to. Thankfully, the
community was consciously involved, and there are ongoing efforts to
further study and interpret this sacred space. However, as the story unfolds, it is not clear that even this degree of delicacy is enough. The descendants of slaves deserve something more than a decision not to redevelop or exclude. The issue of standing has not been resolved, and likely
there would be no liability in the case of desecration. Slavery was exploited to build Jefferson’s University brick by brick, and now it is clear
that slavery’s long shadow must be dismantled the same way, a piece at a
time. It does not take much to make the mental leap: to construe the
property interest of all abandoned slave cemeteries as a public easement in
gross with a right of access, rights against desecration, and restrictions on
alienation. It seems this show of solicitude is sorely needed to give these
sixty-seven dead the same respect seen in the stately University Cemetery, right next door. In any event, it is a start.

138. Cunningham, supra note 25, at 580.

